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This paper investigates extensions of the two fundamental theorems of wel-
fare economics to the framework in which each agent is endowed with three
types of preference relations: an allocation preference relation, an oppor-
tunity preference relation, and an overall preference relation. It is shown
that, under certain conditions, the two theorems can be extended. It is also
pointed out that the conditions underlying the positive results are restrictive.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D63, D711 Introduction
It is often argued that the market mechanism promotes individual freedom
and makes individuals free to choose. However, in the traditional framework
of economic theory, the market mechanism is evaluated exclusively on the
basis of its allocation eﬃciency. The notion of allocation eﬃciency is typi-
cally a “welfaristic” notion in which ﬁnal allocations resulting from the mar-
ket mechanism are judged by the welfare levels of the individuals involved.
Nothing can be said about freedom given to each individual.
Recently, Amartya Sen (1993) put forth explicitly an argument for the
market mechanism to promote individual freedom and to make individuals
free to choose. He distinguished two aspects of freedom: “the opportunity
aspect” and “the process aspect”. The opportunity aspect relates to the op-
portunities of achieving things that each individual values, while the process
aspect is concerned with free decisions of each individual. Sen also established
that, under certain type of assessments of opportunities, the market mecha-
nism attains eﬃcient states in terms of opportunity-freedom. Following Sen
(1993), formal frameworks for “non-welfaristic” analyses have been developed
by Suzumura and Xu (2000, 2001) and by Tadenuma and Xu (2001). In this
paper, using the framework as in Tadenuma and Xu (2001), we examine the
performance of the market mechanism from a non-welfaristic perspective by
paying particular attention to opportunity-eﬃciency, the notion of eﬃciency
in terms of the distributions of opportunity sets, and to overall-eﬃciency, the
notion of eﬃciency in terms of the distributions of pairs of an opportunity
set and a consumption bundle.
In the traditional framework of welfare economics, the performance of
market mechanisms is best summarized by the two fundamental theorems:
(i) the ﬁrst theorem, which claims that, under certain conditions, a mar-
ket mechanism generates an eﬃcient allocation, and (ii) the second theorem,
which asserts that, under some more restrictive conditions, any eﬃcient al-
location can be achieved by a market mechanism through an appropriately
redistribution of agents’ initial endowments. Note that in both theorems,
the notion of eﬃciency is based solely on individual preferences over ﬁnal
consumption bundles, and is a welfaristic one in nature.
To shed light on freedom aspects of a market mechanism, we need to
expand our framework in general and to go beyond the usual notion of eﬃ-
ciency in particular. For this purpose, we deﬁne a conﬁguration as a pair of
an allocation and a distribution of opportunity sets. While the usual notion
3of eﬃciency is based only on the allocation part of a conﬁguration, a con-
ﬁguration contains information about the distribution of opportunity sets as
well. An agent’s opportunity set is viewed as reﬂecting the opportunity as-
pect of freedom (see, for example, Sen (1988, 1993, 2000) and Pattanaik and
Xu (1990)). Depending on how each agent ranks his opportunity sets as well
as on how he assesses his pairs of consumption bundles and opportunity sets,
we can go beyond the notion of allocation eﬃciency to the notion of eﬃciency
with respect to distributions of opportunity sets reﬂecting freedom aspects,
and to the notion of eﬃciency with respect to conﬁgurations reﬂecting agents’
overall attitudes toward consumption bundles and opportunities.
To formalize these ideas, we assume that each agent is endowed with three
types of preference relations: an allocation preference relation that ranks con-
sumption bundles, an opportunity preference relation that ranks opportunity
sets, and an overall preference relation that ranks pairs of consumption bun-
dles and the associated opportunity sets. Using above preference relations,
we introduce three eﬃciency conditions: (i) allocation-Pareto-optimality,
which is the usual notion of eﬃciency of allocations, (ii) opportunity-Pareto-
optimality, which reﬂects the situation in which it is impossible to improve
one agnet’s opportunities without reducing any other agent’s opportunities,
and (iii) overall-Pareto-optimality, which concerns the possibility of improv-
ing one agent’s overall situation without hurting any other agent’s overall
situation. See Section 3 for formal deﬁnitions of these concepts.
With these concepts in hand, we examine the relationship between the
market mechanism and various notions of Pareto optimality, with particular
concern of extending the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics.
We show that, if the opportunity-preference relation of every agent belongs
to the class of opportunity-preference relations that is discussed and exam-
ined by Sen (1993), then the two welfare theorems can be extended without
much diﬃculty. However, once we venture out of this class of opportunity-
preference relations, we may no longer be able to extend the two welfare
theorems. Therefore, the conviction that market mechanisms promote indi-
vidual opportunity-freedom is valid in some limited cases but is not true in
general.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section
2, we present some basic notation and deﬁnitions. Section 3 introduces sev-
eral notions of Pareto optimality in our framework. Extensions of the ﬁrst
welfare theorem and the second theorem are examined in Sections 4 and 5,
respectively. Section 6 discusses the restrictive nature of our results. We
4oﬀer some concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 Notation and Deﬁnitions
There are n agents and k goods. Let N = {1,...,n} be the set of agents.
An allocation is a vector x =( x1,...,x n) ∈ Rnk
+ where for each i ∈ N,
xi =( xi1,...,x ik) ∈ Rk
+ is a consumption bundle of agent i.1 There exist
some ﬁxed amounts of social endowments of goods, which are represented by
the vector ω ∈ Rk
++. An allocation x ∈ Rnk
+ is feasible if
 n
i=1 xi ≤ ω.2 Let
Z be the set of all feasible allocations.
For each i ∈ N,a nopportunity set for agent i is a set in Rk
+. In this
paper, we consider opportunity sets that are compact and comprehensive.3
The class of all compact and comprehensive opportunity sets are denoted by
O. A special subclass of O, namely the class of (constrained) budget sets,
has some importance in this paper. Let Ω ≡{ y0 ∈ Rk
+ | y0 ≤ ω}. For each
i ∈ N,abudget set for agent i at a price vector p ∈ Rk
+ and a consumption
bundle xi ∈ Rk
+ is deﬁned by
B(p,xi)={yi ∈ R
k
+ | p · yi ≤ p · xi}∩Ω
Let B = {B(p,xi) | p ∈ Rk
+,x i ∈ Rk
+}.Adistribution of opportunity sets is an
n-tuple O =( O1,...,O n) ∈O n.Aconﬁguration is a pair (x,O) ∈ Rnk
+ ×O n
such that xi ∈ Oi for all i ∈ N. For each (x,O) ∈ Rnk
+ ×O n and each i ∈ N,
the individual state of agent i at (x,O) is the pair (xi,O i).
For each i ∈ N and each Oi ∈O , let
∂Oi ≡{ yi ∈ Oi |∀ wi ∈ R
k
+ : wi >> yi ⇒ wi / ∈ Oi}
A conﬁguration (x,O) ∈ Rnk
+ ×O n is feasible if (i) x ∈ Z and (ii) for every
i ∈ N, and every yi ∈ ∂Oi, there exists (y1,...,y i−1,y i+1,...,y n) ∈ Πj =i∂Oj
1As usual, R+ is the set of all non-negative real numbers, and R++ is the set of all
positive real numbers.
2Vector inequalities are as usual: ≥,>and >>.
3A set A ⊆ Rk
+ is comprehensive if x ∈ A and 0 ≤ y ≤ x imply y ∈ A. Comprehen-
siveness is a reasonable assumption for opportunity sets. It means that if a consumption
bundle x is available for an agent, then any consumption bundle y containing a less amount
of each good than x is also available for the agent.
5such that (y1,...,y n) ∈ Z.4
Given a set X,apreference quasiorder on X is a reﬂexive and transitive
binary relation on X. When a preference quasiorder is also complete, it is
called a preference order. Each agent i ∈ N is endowed with the following
three preference relations.
1. An allocation preference order on Rk
+, denoted RA
i , which is continuous
and monotonic.
2. An opportunity preference quasiorder on O, denoted RO
i , which is mono-
tonic in the following sense:
(i) For all O1,O 2 ∈O ,O 1 ⊆ O2 ⇒ O2 RO
i O1
(ii) For all O1,O 2 ∈O ,O 1 ⊂ intO2 ⇒ O2 PO
i O1, where intO2 is the relative
interior of O2 in Rk
+.5
3. An overall preference quasiorder on Rk
+ ×O, denoted ¯ Ri.
Let RA,RO, and ¯ R denote the classes of allocation preference orders,
opportunity preference quasiorders, and overall preference quasiorders, re-
spectively. Let R = RA ×R O × ¯ R.A preference proﬁle is a list R =
(R1,...,R n) ∈R n where Ri =( RA
i ,R O
i , ¯ Ri) for each i ∈ N.
We will consider several conditions on the relationships between overall
preference quasiorders and the other two preference quasiorders:
Condition A: For all (xi,O i),(yi,C i) ∈ Rk
+ ×O,
(i) (xi,O i) ¯ Ri (yi,C i) ⇒ [xi RA
i yi or Oi RO
i Ci],
(ii) (xi,O i) ¯ Pi (yi,C i) ⇒ [xi PA
i yi or Oi PO
i Ci].
Condition B:6 For all (xi,O i),(yi,C i) ∈ Rk
+ ×O,
(i) [xi RA
i yi and Oi RO
i Ci] ⇒ (xi,O i) ¯ Ri (yi,C i),
(ii) [xi PA
i yi and Oi PO
i Ci] ⇒ (xi,O i) ¯ Pi (yi,C i).
Note that in general, there is no logical relation between Conditions A and
B. However, if the opportunity preference quasiorder is complete, then Con-
dition B implies Condition A, whereas if the overall preference quasiorder
4Our notion of a feasible distribution of opportunity sets as ﬁgured in the deﬁnition of
a feasible conﬁguration reﬂects the idea that, in a social setting, one agent’s opportunity
set may depend on other agents’ opportunity sets, and therefore, agents’ opportunity-
freedoms are inter-related to and inter-dependent on each other. See, for example, Basu
(1987), Gravel, Laslier and Trannoy (1998), and Pattanaik (1994) for some discussions
of the issues relating to the inter-dependence of agents’ opportunity sets and freedom of
choice.
5As usual, the strict preference relation associated to RO
i is denoted P O
i . Similar
notation is used for other preference relations.
6In Tadenuma and Xu (2001), we assume this condition.
6is complete, then Condition A implies Condition B. (Hence, if both the op-
portunity preference quasiorder and the overall preference quasiorder are
complete, then Conditions A and B are equivalent.)
We will also consider some “extreme” preferences. Let Ri =
(RA
i ,R O
i , ¯ Ri) ∈Rbe given. We say that agent i ∈ N is a consequential-
ist at Ri if ∀(xi,B i),(yi,C i) ∈ Rk
+ ×O:( xi,B i)¯ Ri(yi,C i) ⇔ xi RA
i yi.W e
say that agent i ∈ N is a non-consequentialist at Ri if ∀(xi,B i),(yi,C i) ∈
Rk
+ ×O:( xi,B i)¯ Ri(yi,C i) ⇔ Bi RO
i Ci.
3 Pareto-Optimality
In this paper, we focus on “autonomous” conﬁgurations, at which the speci-
ﬁed consumption bundle for each agent is actually the best one in his oppor-
tunity set by his allocation preference order.
Let R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n be given, where Ri =( RA
i ,R O
i , ¯ Ri) for all
i ∈ N. We say that a conﬁguration (x,O) ∈ Rk
+ ×Ois autonomous for
R if it is feasible and for every i ∈ N, and every yi ∈ Bi, xi RA
i yi. Let
Z(R) denote the set of all autonomous conﬁgurations for R. A conﬁguration
(x,B) ∈ Z is decentralizable for R if it is autonomous and B ∈B n. Let D(R)
be the set of decentralizable conﬁgurations for R.
A conﬁguration (y,C) ∈ Z allocation-Pareto-dominates (x,O) ∈ Z for R
if yi RA
i xi for every i ∈ N and yi PA
i xi for some i ∈ N. A conﬁguration
(x,O) ∈ Z is allocation-Pareto-optimal for R if no autonomous conﬁguration
allocation-Pareto-dominates it. We deﬁne opportunity-Pareto-domination
and opportunity-Pareto-optimality by replacing allocation preference orders
with opportunity preference quasiorders in the above deﬁnitions. We also
deﬁne analogously overall-Pareto-domination and overall-Pareto-optimality
based on overall preference quasiorders.
Sen (1993) considers the following conditions of opportunity preference
quasiorders (See Sen’s Axiom O on p.530):
(i) for all Oi,C i ∈O , Oi RO
i Ci only if there exists xi ∈ Oi such that xi RA
i yi
for every yi ∈ Ci, and
(ii) for all Oi,C i ∈O , Oi PO
i Ci only if there exists xi ∈ Oi such that
xi PA
i yi for all yi ∈ Ci.
Let ˆ RO be the class of opportunity preference quasiorders satisfying the
above conditions. Note that the above conditions are necessary conditions
for Oi RO
i Ci and Oi PO
i Ci. However, if RO
i is complete, then they are also
7suﬃcient conditions.
When RO
i ∈ ˆ RO for every i ∈ N, several logical relations hold between
various notions of Pareto-optimality in our framework.
Proposition 1 Let R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n be such that for every i ∈ N,
RO
i ∈ ˆ RO.
(i) If (x,O) ∈ Z(R) is allocation-Pareto-optimal for R, then (x,O) is
opportunity-Pareto-optimal for R.
(ii) Suppose that for every i ∈ N, RO
i is complete. Then, (x,O) ∈ Z(R)
is allocation-Pareto-optimal for R if and only if (x,O) is opportunity-
Pareto-optimal for R.
Proof:
(i) Let (x,O) ∈ Z(R) be an allocation-Pareto-optimal conﬁguration for R.
Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists (y,C) ∈ Z(R) that opportunity-
Pareto-dominates (x,O). Then, for every i ∈ N, Ci RO
i Oi, and there exists
j ∈ N with Cj PO
j Oj. For every i ∈ N, since RO
i ∈ ˆ RO, there exists zi ∈ Ci
such that zi RA
i wi for all wi ∈ Oi. Because (y,C) is autonomous and zi ∈ Ci,
we have yi RA
i zi. By the transitivity of RA
i , yiRA
i wi for all wi ∈ Oi. Letting
wi = xi, we have yiRA
i xi. Similarly, we can show that yj PA
j xj. Thus, (y,C)
allocation-Pareto-dominates (x,O), which contradicts the allocation-Pareto-
optimality of (x,O). Therefore, (x,O) is opportunty-Pareto-optimal.
(ii) Suppose that for every i ∈ N, RO
i is complete. Let (x,O) ∈
Z(R). If (x,O) is allocation-Pareto-optimal for R, then, from (i), (x,O)
is opportunity-Pareto-optimal for R. It remains to show that if (x,O)i s
opportunity-Pareto-optimal for R, then (x,O) is allocation-Pareto-optimal
for R as well. Let (x,O) be opportunity-Pareto-optimal for R. Suppose,
to the contrary, that there exists (y,C) ∈ Z(R) that allocation-Pareto-
dominates (x,O). Then, for every i ∈ N, yi RA
i xi, and there exists j ∈ N
with yj PA
j xj. Since (x,O) is autonomous, it follows that for every i ∈ N,
and every wi ∈ Oi, xi RA
i wi, and hence, yiRA
i wi. Because RO
i ∈ ˆ RO for
every i ∈ N, there exists no i ∈ N with Oi PO
i Ci. Since RO
i is complete, we
have Ci RO
i Oi for every i ∈ N. By a similar argument, we can show that
Cj PO
j Oj. Hence, (y,C) opportunity-Pareto-dominates (x,O), which is a
contradiction. Therfore, (x,O) is allocation-Pareto-optimal.
8Proposition 2 Let R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n be such that for every i ∈ N,
RO
i ∈ ˆ RO.
(i) Suppose that for every i ∈ N, Ri satisﬁes Condition A. If (x,O) ∈ Z(R)
is allocation-Pareto-optimal for R, then (x,O) is overall-Pareto-optimal
for R.
(ii) Suppose for every i ∈ N, Ri satisﬁes Condition B. If (x,O) ∈ Z(R) is
overall-Pareto-optimal for R, then (x,O) is allocation-Pareto-optimal
for R.
Proof:
(i) Suppose that for every i ∈ N, Ri satisﬁes Condition A. Let (x,O) ∈ Z(R)
be an allocation-Pareto-optimal conﬁguration for R. Suppose, to the con-
trary, that there exists (y,C) ∈ Z(R) that overall-Pareto-dominates (x,O).
Then, for every i ∈ N,( yi,C i) ¯ Ri(xi,O i), and there exists j ∈ N with
(yj,C j) ¯ Pj(xj,O j). Because for every i ∈ N, Ri satisﬁes Condition A, we
have [yi RA
i xi or Ci RO
i Oi] for every i ∈ N, and [yj PA
j xj or Cj PO
j Oj].
Since RO
i ∈ ˆ RO for every i ∈ N, and (y,C) is autonomous for R, it follows
that for every i ∈ N,[ Ci RO
i Oi ⇒ yi RA
i xi], and [Ci PO
i Oi ⇒ yi PA
i xi].
Therefore, for every i ∈ N,yi RA
i xi, and yj PA
j xj, which contradicts the
allocation-Pareto-optimality of (x,O). Therefore, (x,O) is overall-Pareto-
optimal.
(ii) Suppose that for every i ∈ N, Ri satisﬁes Condition B. Let (x,O) ∈
Z(R) be an overall-Pareto-optimal conﬁguration for R. Suppose, to the
contrary, that there exists (y,C) ∈ Z(R) that allocation-Pareto-dominates
(x,O). Then, for all i ∈ N, yi RA
i xi, and there exists j ∈ N with yj PA
j xj.
By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1 (ii), we can show that
Ci RO
i Oi for every i ∈ N, and Cj PO
j Oj. Since Ri satisﬁes Condition B, it
follows that (yi,C i)¯ Ri(xi,O i) for every i ∈ N, and (yj,C j)¯ Pj(xj,O j). Hence,
(y,C) overall-Pareto-dominates (x,O), which is a contradiction. Thus, (x,O)
is allocation-Pareto-optimal.
Corollary 1 Let R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n be such that for every i ∈ N,
RO
i ∈ ˆ RO, RO
i is complete, and Ri satisﬁes Condition B. Let (x,O) ∈ Z(R).
Then, the following three statements are equivalent:
(a) (x,O) is allocation-Pareto-optimal for R,
(b) (x,O) is opportunity-Pareto-optimal for R,
(c) (x,O) is overall-Pareto-optimal for R.
9Proof: When RO
i is complete for every i ∈ N, the equivalence of (a) and
(b) follows from Proposition 1(ii). From our remarks immediately after in-
troducing Conditions A and B, when RO
i is complete, Condition B implies
Condition A. Then, the equivalence of (a) and (c) follows from Proposition
2.
4 Extensions of the First Welfare Theorem
To begin with, we observe the following results that do not rely on any further
assumptions on opportunity-preference quasiorders, and that follow from our
assumptions on allocation-preference orders.
Proposition 3 For every R ∈R n, every decentralizable conﬁguration for R
is allocation-Pareto-optimal for R.
Proposition 4 Let R ∈R n be such that every i ∈ N is a consequentialist at
R. Then, every decentralizable conﬁguration for R is overall-Pareto-optimal
for R.
Proposition 3 is a restatement of the classical ﬁrst welfare theorem in our
framework. Proposition 4 reiterates that, in a consequentialist framework,
the extension of the ﬁrst welfare theorem is straightforward.
Next, we consider extensions of the ﬁrst welfare theorem when the
opportunity-preference quasiorder of each agent is in the class ˆ RO. The
following proposition summarizes our ﬁndings.
Proposition 5 Let R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n be such that for every i ∈ N,
RO
i ∈ ˆ RO.
(i) [Sen, 1993, and Tadenuma and Xu, 2001] Every decentralizable conﬁgu-
ration for R is opportunity-Pareto-optimal for R.
(ii) Suppose that for every i ∈ N, i is a non-consequentialist at Ri. Then,
every decentralizable conﬁguration for R is overall-Pareto-optimal for
R.
(iii) Suppose that for every i ∈ N, Ri satisﬁes Condition A. Then, every
decentralizable conﬁguration for R is overall-Pareto-optimal for R.
10Proof: Claim (i) follows from Propositions 1(i) and 3. Claim (ii) follows
from Claim (i) and the deﬁntion of a non-consequentialist, and Claim (iii)
follows from Propostions 2(i) and 3.
Therefore, if each agent’s opportunity-preference quasiorder is the type
discussed by Sen (1993), there is essentially no diﬃculty of extending the
classical ﬁrst welfare theorem to our framework. Note that the type of an
agent’s opportunity-preference quasiorders discussed by Sen is intimately
linked with the agent’s allocation-preference order. Together with Condi-
tion A, the agent comes very close being a consequentialist. It is therefore
not surprising to see that the ﬁrst welfare theorem can be extended in the
current framework without much diﬃculty.
5 Extensions of the Second Welfare Theorem
In this section, we assume that for every i ∈ N, the allocation-preference
order RA
i ∈R A is convex. When the opportunity preference quasiorder of
every agent is complete, we obtain the following results.
Proposition 6 Let R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n be such that for every i ∈ N,
RO
i ∈ ˆ RO, and RO
i is complete. Let (x,O) ∈ Z(R) with xi >> 0 for every
i ∈ N.I f (x,O) is either allocation-Pareto-optimal or opportunity-Pareto-
optimal for R, then there exists a decentralizable conﬁguration (x,B) ∈ D(R)
such that Bi IO
i Oi for every i ∈ N.
Proof: We note that, by Proposition 1(ii), when RO
i is complete for every i ∈
N,( x,B) is allocation-Pareto-optimal for R if and only if it is opportunity-
Pareto-optimal for R. Suppose that xi >> 0 for every i ∈ N, and (x,O)
is allocation-Pareto-optimal for R (and hence opportunity-Pareto-optimal
for R as well.) Since for every i ∈ N, RA
i is continuous, monotonic and
convex, and xi >> 0 for all i ∈ N, it follows from the second fundamental
theorem of welfare economics that there exists a price vector p ∈ Rk
+ such that
(x,B) ∈ D(R) with B ≡ (B(p,x1),...,B(p,xn)). To show that Bi IO
i Oi
for every i ∈ N, suppose the contrary. Then, since RO
i is complete for every
i ∈ N, and (x,O) is opportunity-Pareto-optimal for R, there must exist
j ∈ N with Oj PO
j Bj. Because RO
j ∈ ˆ RO and (x,O) is autonomous for R,
xj PA
j wj for every wj ∈ Bj. But then, since xj ∈ Bj, we have xj PA
j xj,
which is a contradiction. Thus, for every i ∈ N, Bi IO
i Oi.
11Proposition 7 Let R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n be such that for every i ∈ N,
RO
i ∈ ˆ RO, RO
i is complete, and Ri satisﬁes Condition B. Let (x,O) ∈ Z(R)
with xi >> 0 for i ∈ N. Suppose that one of the following three statements
is true:
(a) (x,O) is allocation-Pareto optimal for R.
(b) (x,O) is opportunity-Pareto optimal for R.
(c) (x,O) is overall-Pareto optimal for R.
Then, there exists a decentralizable conﬁguration (x,B) ∈ D(R) such that for
every i ∈ N, Bi IO
i Oi and (xi,B i)¯ Ii(xi,O i).
Proof: Let (x,O) ∈ Z(R) be such that xi >> 0 for every i ∈ N.
(a): Suppose that (x,O) is allocation-Pareto-optimal for R. From Proposi-
tion 6, there exists a decentralizable conﬁguration (x,B) ∈ D(R) such that
Bi IO
i Oi for every i ∈ N. Obviously, for every i ∈ N, xi IA
i xi. Then, since
Ri satisﬁes Condition B, it follows that (xi,O i)¯ Ii(xi,B i) for every i ∈ N.
(b),(c): Suppose that (x,O) is opportunity-Pareto-optimal or overall-
Pareto-optimal for R. Then, by Propositions 1 and 2, (x,O) is allocation-
Pareto-optimal for R. Hence, the claim follows from the argument in (a).
If we do not require completeness of opportunity preference relations,
then we have the following results.
Proposition 8 Let R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n be such that for every i ∈
N,RO
i ∈ ˆ RO.L e t (x,O) ∈ Z(R) with xi >> 0 for every i ∈ N.I f (x,O)
is allocation-Pareto optimal for R, then there exists (x,B) ∈ D(R) such that
for every i ∈ N, not[Oi PO
i Bi].
Proof: From the second theorem of welfare economics, the existence of
(x,B) ∈ D(R) is guaranteed. Suppose to the contrary that, for some i ∈
N, Oi PO
i Bi. Since RO
i ∈ ˆ RO, it must be true that there exists yi ∈
Oi with yiPA
i zi for every zi ∈ Bi. In particular, yiPA
i xi. Because (x,O)
is autonomous, xiRA
i wi for every wi ∈ Oi, and hence xiRA
i yi. This is a
contradiction.
Proposition 9 Let R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n be such that for every i ∈
N,RO
i ∈ ˆ RO and Ri satisﬁes Condition A. Let (x,O) ∈ Z(R) with xi >> 0
for every i ∈ N.I f(x,O) is allocation-Pareto optimal for R, then there exists
(x,B) ∈ D(R) such that for every i ∈ N, not[(xi,O i)¯ Pi(xi,B i)].
12Proof: Suppose, to the contrary, that for some i ∈ N,( xi,O i)¯ Pi(xi,B i).
Since Ri satisﬁes Condition A, and xiIA
i xi, we must have OiPO
i Bi. Following
a similar arguement as in the proof of Proposition 8, we reach a contradiction.
The ﬁnal two propositions in this section state that for any conﬁguration
(x,O) (which may be opportunity Pareto optimal or overall Pareto opti-
mal), we can ﬁnd a decentralizable conﬁguration (y,B) that is no worse than
(x,O) for any agent with respect to his allocation preferences, opportunity
preferences, and/or overall preferences.
Proposition 10 Let R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n be such that for every i ∈
N,RO
i ∈ ˆ RO.L e t(x,O) ∈ Z(R) with xi >> 0 for every i ∈ N. Then, there
exists (y,B) ∈ D(R) such that for every i ∈ N, yi RA
i xi and not[Oi PO
i Bi].
Proof: Under our assumptions on RA
i for each i ∈ N, and the assump-
tion that xi >> 0 for every i ∈ N, there exists a Walras equilibrium
for the initial endowments (x1,···,x n), that is, there exist a price vec-
tor p ∈ Rk
+ and an allocation y ∈ Rnk
+ such that (y,B) ∈ D(R) with
B ≡ (B(p,x1),···,B(p,xn)) = (B(p,y1),···,B(p,yn)). Then, for every
i ∈ N, yi RA
i xi. Following similar arguments as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 8, we can show that for every i ∈ N, not[OiPO
i Bi].
Proposition 11 Let R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n be such that for every i ∈
N,RO
i ∈ ˆ RO and Ri satisﬁes Condition A. Let (x,O) ∈ Z(R) with xi >> 0
for every i ∈ N. Then, there exists (y,B) ∈ D(R) such that for every i ∈ N,
yi RA
i xi, not[Oi PO
i Bi] and not[(xi,O i)¯ Pi(yi,B i)].
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 10, and it is omitted.
Recall our remark in Section 5 that the type of an agent’s opportunity-
preference quasiorders discussed by Sen indicates the agent comes very close
to being a consequentialist. It is therefore easy to see that, in our framework,
if all the agents’ opportunity-preference quasi-orders are the type discussed
by Sen, the classical second welfare theorem can be extended without much
diﬃculty.
136 Opportunity Preferences with Superset
Domination
So far we have seen that if opportunity preference quasiorders are restricted
to the class ˆ RO, the two welfare theorems can be extended without easily.
However, the class ˆ RO of opportunity-preference quasiorders represents only
one of possible types of preferences for opportunities. Let us next consider
opportunity preference quasiorders satisfying the following “superset domi-
nation” condition. Let µ be the Lebesgue measure on Rk.
Condition S: For all Ai,B i ∈O ,
(i) Ai ⊇ Bi ⇒ Ai RO
i Bi, and
(ii) Ai ⊇ Bi and µ(Ai) >µ (Bi) ⇒ Ai PO
i Bi.
Let ˜ RO be the class of opportnity preference quasiorders satisfying Con-
dition S. Many opportunity preference quasiorders discussed in the literature
on ranking opportunity sets belong to ˜ RO. On the other hand, notice that no
opportunity-preference quasiorder in ˆ RO is in ˜ RO. In this section, we exam-
ine the possibility of extending the two welfare theorems when opportunity-
preference quasiorders are elements of ˜ RO.
We consider ﬁrst the opportunity preference quasiorder that ranks op-
portunity sets only by inclusion relations: for all Ai,B i ∈O , Ai RO
i Bi if
and only if Ai ⊇ Bi. With this opportunity preference quasiorder, however,
a decentralizable conﬁguration is not necessarily opportunity-Pareto-optimal
as the following example shows.
Example 1 Let N = {1,2}, k = 2 and R =( R1,R 2). For every i ∈ N, and
for all Ai,B i ∈O , Ai RO
i Bi if and only if Bi ⊆ Ai. For every i ∈ N, RA
i is





5xi2 if xi2 ≤
1
2xi1
2xi1 + xi2 if
1
2xi1 <x i2 < 2xi1
4xi1 if 2xi1 ≤ xi2
Let ω = (10,10). Deﬁne (x∗,B) ∈ Z as follows: for each i ∈ N, x∗
i ≡ (5,5)
and Bi ≡ B(p,x∗
i) where p ≡ (2,1). Then, (x∗,B) ∈ D(R). For each i ∈ N,
deﬁne
Ci ≡ Bi ∪{ xi ∈ R
2
+ | 0 ≤ xi1 ≤ 10,x i2 =0 }.
14Clearly, for every i ∈ N, Ci ⊇ Bi and Ci  = Bi, and hence Ci Pi Bi. Moreover,
(x∗,C) is autonomous for R. Thus, (x∗,B) is not opportunity-Pareto-optimal
for R.
Next, we consider another interesting subclass of ˜ RO, namely the class
of “additive” opportunity preference orders. Let i ∈ N and RO
i ∈R O.W e
say that RO
i is additive if there exists an integrable function fi : Rk
+ → R++











i is additive, then RO
i ∈ ˜ RO. A case of particular interest
is when the function fi coincides with the utility function ui : Rk
+ → R++
representing the allocation preference order. In this case, opportunity sets are
ranked according to the sum of the utilities of possible consumption bundles
in each set.
The following example shows that when every agent has an additive op-
portunity preference order, a decentralizable conﬁguration is not necessarily
opportunity-Pareto-optimal. Moreover, there exists a Pareto-optimal allo-
cation x∗ >> 0 such that no decentralizable conﬁguration that supports x∗
(that is, (x,B) ∈ D(R) with x = x∗) is opportunity-Pareto-optimal.7 Thus,
neither the ﬁrst nor the second fundamental welfare theorem cannnot be
extended to this class of opportunity preference orders.
Example 2 Let N = {1,2}, k = 2 and R ≡ (R1,R 2). Each i ∈ N has the
following utility function ui : R2





5xi2 if xi2 ≤
1
4xi1
xi1 + xi2 if
1

















7Note, however, that there always exists a decentralizable conﬁguration that is
opportunity-Pareto-optimal. Simply give one agent all resources, and let his opportunity
set be the whole Edgeworth box.
15Let ω ≡ (10,10). Deﬁne (x∗,B) ∈ Z as follows: for each i ∈ N, x∗
i ≡ (5,5)
and Bi ≡ B(p∗,x ∗
i) where p∗ ≡ (1,1). Then, (x∗,B) ∈ D(R). Moreover,
(x∗,B) is the unique decentralizable conﬁguration that supports the Pareto-
optimal allocation x∗. For each i ∈ N, deﬁne
Ci ≡{ xi ∈ R
2
+ | xi ∈ Bi and xi2 ≤ 9}
∪{xi ∈ R
2
+ | 0 ≤ xi2 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ xi1 ≤ 10}.
Clearly, (x∗,C) is autonomous for R. It can be calculated that for every






Hence, for every i ∈ N, Ci PO
i Bi. Thus, (x∗,B) is not opportunity-Pareto-
optimal.
7 Concluding Remarks
To some limited extent, we can extend the fundamental welfare theorems
to incorporate not only allocation Pareto optimality but opportunity Pareto
optimality and overall Pareto optimality as well. When agents’ opportunity-
preferences are of the types discussed in Sections 4 and 5, the market mech-
anism may be regarded as appealing since it generates conﬁgurations that
are allocation Pareto optimal, opportunity Pareto optimal and overall Pareto
optimal (extensions of the ﬁrst fundamental theorem of welfare economics).
Furthermore, for every conﬁguration that is allocation Pareto optimal, we
can ﬁnd a market mechanism to support it, and for every conﬁguration that
is either opportunity Pareto optimal or overall Pareto optimal, we can ﬁnd a
market mechanism to achieve a conﬁguration that is not worse than the given
conﬁguration in terms of allocation preferences, opportunity preferences and
overall preferences (extensions of the second fundamental theorem of welfare
economics).
As we have also shown, however, that the above results depend crucially
on the particular classes of opportunity preference relations. If we go beyond
these classes, we may encounter diﬃculties in extending the two theorems
of welfare economics. The diﬃculties point to the incompatibility of alloca-
tion Pareto optimality, opportunity Pareto optimality, and/or overall Pareto
16optimality. We have used some speciﬁc class of opportunity preference re-
lations to illustrate the possible conﬂict. Investigation into various types of
opportunity-preference relations may deserve further exploration.
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